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My thesis 1 is very simple: every realist should be 
a Platonist. By the term "realist" I mean anyone who 
believes that universals exist. By "riatonist" I mean 
anyone who thinks: (1) that universals are not in 
space and time and (2) that there are uninstantiated 
universals. Hence, my claim is that anyone who 
believes that universals exist ought also to admit that 
universals are not in space and time and that there are 
uninstantiated universals. 
However, questions arise. What, for example, is 
the nature of a universal? It might be thought that 
the very idea of a universal is that of an entity not 
in space and time, so that anyone who identified 
universals with things in space and time could hardly 
be said to believe in the existence of universals. 
What, then, could the suggestion that universals are in 
space and time mean? Similarly, it might seem that a 
commitment to the existence of universals in its very 
nature involves belief in uninstantiated universals. 
If not, what would the claim that there are universals 
amount to? 
If one thing is clear, it is that we must get 
straight on just what belief in the existence of 
universals does and does not entail. I will not, 
therefore, argue at any great length for the existence 
of universals. Rather, I will try to show what someone 
who claims that universals exist is trying to do, and I 
will attempt to clarify the concept of a universal. It 
will then be open to anyone either to accept or reject 
the claim that universals exist. It seems to me, 
indeed, that a proper understanding of the nature of a 
universal makes belief in the existence of universals— 
and by this I mean Platonic universals—virtually 
unobjectionable. But whether anyone with what I would 
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like to call a proper understanding of the nature of a 
universal chooses to accept or to reject the existence 
of universals is a topic I will not pursue. 
My strategy will be the following: first, I will 
indicate, however briefly, what the realist is 
attempting to do when he claims that there are such 
things as universals. Second, I will try to say what 
universals are at least supposed to be. The bulk of 
the paper will be given over to a discussion of the 
question whether universals are in space and time. I 
will argue that anyone who admits the existence of 
universals in any sense ought to admit the existence of 
entities not in space and time which are "independent" 
in the Platonic sense. 
What the realist is attempting to do, I believe, is 
to account for the fact of sameness. Or, to say the 
same thing in different words, he is attempting to give 
an ontological ground for the phenomenon of sameness. 
That sameness exists seems to me to be 
incontrovertible. Even if individual objects are one 
and all particular, so that each is numerically 
different from all the others, different objects may 
share common features. Two different objects may both 
be colored blue and are therefore in a genuine and 
important sense the "same." Moreover, if all blue 
objects were suddenly to disappear, it would always be 
possible at some later time for another object to bear 
the "same" blue quality. One way of viewing the 
enterprise known as ontology is as an attempt to give 
an account of such obvious phenomena as sameness and 
difference. In the tradition that goes back at least 
to Plato, phenomena are accounted for, or given an 
ontological ground, by claiming that they represent 
categories of reality. When the realist claims that 
universals exist, he is merely trying to say that many 
things seem to exhibit the phenomenon of sameness or 
that sameness is a fundamental feature of the world, 
and he is attempting to capture the phenomenon by means 
of a category. 
Whether one agrees that this is what the realist is 
trying to do, or even that the realist is right in 
trying to do it, there is obvious disagreement 
concerning the nature of a universal. In recent times 
some philosophers have claimed that universals are in 
space and time. This is significantly different from 
the Platonist's view, since there is clearly a great 
difference between entities which are in space and time 
and those which are not. It is strange that both 
should be claiming the existence of universals when 
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they are apparently attaching such different meanings 
to the word. Still, the recent philosophers do claim 
that universals exist, so there is perhaps some 
justification for their claim to be realists. In order 
to distinguish their position from that of the 
Platonists, and for reasons which will become clear, 
let us call such philosophers "empiricist realists." 
For a better grasp of the difference between the 
two views, let us consider, first of all, the Platonist 
or "traditional" view in more detail. Whether Plato 
himself ever held the view is contentious, but, 
fortunately, what Plato actually thought is not as 
important for us as the more or less coherent position 
usually ascribed to him. For that matter, there is not 
even unanimity on the "Platonic" view, but for our 
purposes it may be taken to be the following: Assuming 
two ordinary blue squares at places p. and P_ at time 
t^, the quality blue, which characterizes the object at 
p., is said to be an instance of the universal 
"Blueness," and the same thing holds for the quality 
characterizing the object at p_. Universals are not in 
space and time. The instances, which are in space and 
time, differ numerically, but they are all instances of 
the same universal, which itself is outside space and 
time. The relationship between a universal and one of 
its instances is that of "participation" or 
"imitation;" all blue things participate in, or 
imitate, blueness. Alternatively, it is "in virtue of" 
the universal that an instance is what it is; it iij in 
virtue of blueness that all instances of blueness are 
blue. The universal, in short, provides an 
explanation, in the sense of an ontological ground, for 
why individual things are what they are. Furthermore, 
according to the view under consideration, universals 
are "independent." The existence of any given 
universal does not depend on the existence of anything 
else, and certainly not on that of any of its 
instances. Of course, this opens the door to the 
poRsib.i lity of "uninstantiated universals," that is, 
universals which never have instances anywhere, and, 
indeed, Platonism holds the existence of uninstantiated 
universals. Finally, usually associated with the 
Platonic view is the notion that it is impossible to 
"perceive" universals in any ordinary sense of the 
term; rather, they are objects c-f: "intuition," 
"intellect," or "pure ratiocination." 
In contrast, the empiricist realist holds that 
exactly the same blueness is in p. and p„ at t.. . 
Literally the same thing is in different places at tue 
same time, or if you prefer, the universal blueness is 
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identified with the guality blue. Instances of 
universals do not exist, because the claim that there 
are instances would mean that there is an inherent 
difference between the instance and the thing the 
instance is an instance of, namely, the universal, and 
this is precisely what the view in question wishes to 
deny. Since there are no instances, there is no 
problem in regard to the relationship between a 
universial and its instances, although there are, of 
course, problems concerning the relationships among 
various universals and, also, concerning the 
relationship between universals and particulars, if 
these latter are thought to exist. Universals are not 
independent, nor, obviously, are there uninstantiated 
universals. It also appears to be compatible with this 
view, although it does not necessarily follow from it, 
that at least some universals are accessible to sense 
perception. One can see blueness and squareness. 
Whether all universals are accessible to perception 
must remain open to question, because mental 
awarenesses, such as believings and wonderings, are 
sometimes taken to be universals, and it is at least 
doubtful that these are apprehended by perception. 
Direct acquaintance, in contradistinction to 
perception, is a mode of awareness which would seem to 
apply equally to qualities of objects and mental 
awareness. 
Various considerations support the view that 
universals are in space and time. For some 
philosophers, it would seem, there is an apparent 
absurdity in claiming that blueness is not the object 
of sense awareness, so that universals must be in space 
and time. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, in 
criticizing the belief that "universals are indifferent 
to the buzz of space and time," argues that: 
if we can point to and percieve universals, 
then universals must be locatable. The basis 
of the traditional doctrine is, I suppose, a 
vague intuition of the fact that places and 
times play no role in determining the identity 
of universals. But of course it does not 
follow from this that universals are outside 
of space and time. Greenness does appear at 
certain times and places. 
To the Platonist, however, Wolterstorff 1s argument 
appears to beg the question. It seems to be the 
following: 
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(J.) If we perceive universals, they are in space 
and time. 
(2) We perceive universals. 
Therefore universals are in space and time. 
One who holds the traditional doctrine might point out 
that (2) presupposes the very point at issue. If one 
refuses to grant beforehand that universals are in 
space and time, the claim that we perceive universals 
is much less plausible. 
Similarly, there is an argument to the effect that 
universals are in space and time because their 
exemplifications are. According to Alan Donagan, 
there is strong reason for thinking that if 
viniversals are exemplified in space and time, 
they are where they are exemplified. You can 
verify the statement that Russell is in his 
room by looking into it and seeing him there. 
When you look, you see not only -him and his 
room, but also that he is in it. 
Again, however, the Platonist finds that the argument 
begs the question. 
It seems to be: 
(1) If universals are exemplified in space and 
time, they are in space and time. 
(2) Universals are exemplified in space and time. 
Therefore, universals are in space and time. 
When Donagan says that universals are "exemplified" in 
space and time, he probably means nothing more than 
that the instances of universals, if there are such, 
are in space and time. The Platonist, however, would 
be unconvinced that (2) is true. While he would 
probably be willing to grant that qualities are in 
space and time, there is little reason to suppose that 
he would allow the identification of a quality and a 
universal, since it begs the point at issue. Even if 
qualities are exemplified in space and time, unless 
qualities are universals it does not follow that 
universals are exemplified in space and time. 
The arguments advanced by Wolterstorff and Donagan 
are unimpressive. There are, however, other arguments 
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to show that universals are in space and t i m e — 
arguments which take the form of criticisms of the 
traditional view. If the view that universals are not 
in space and time is shown to be seriously deficient, 
the position taken by Wolterstorff and Donagan should 
be taken more seriously, even if the arguments they 
give are unconvincing. 
In the first place, then, universals not in space 
and time are supposed to be unitary. Blueness, for 
example, is one thing. But then a doubt arises as to 
the genuine universality of a universal. If a 
universal is one thing and quite apart from all its 
instances, is it not itself particularized? Thus, 
Donald Brownstein, for example, attributes to Platonism 
the view that: 
large things are, though in a deficient way, 
like Largeness, i.e., they are large. 
Beautiful things are, though deficiently, like 
Beauty itself, i.e., beautiful. To partake of 
F-ness is to be, though deficiently, like F-
ness. 
But then he asks, 
What, to paraphrase Berkeley, could be like 
one particular large thing but another 
particular large thing? To object that Forms 
[that is, Platonic universals] are not things 
misses the point, which is that they are 
particulars. Perhaps they are super-
particulars, having those qualities that they 
do in some superior manner, but they are no 
less particular for all that. 
Brownstein's argument depends on the supposition that 
an instance of a universal is something like the 
universal itself, which is reinforced by the 
Platonist's characterization of the relation between 
the two as that of "imitation." If particulars imitate 
universals, they must in some degree be similar to 
universals. It then seems hard to escape the 
conclusion that a universal, like a particular, is one 
thing and hence not universal at all. Brownstein 
thinks the only view which does justice to the 
universality of universals is one which places them 
squarely in space and time. Whether he is correct in 
thinking this remains to be explored, but in any 
event the question he raises is interesting. A 
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universal which is one thing appears to lose something 
of its universality. 
If, on the other hand, we take very seriously the 
notion that instances are in space and time and 
universals are not, it turns out that there is a very 
great dissimilarity between the two kinds of tilings. 
And whole new problems emerge. First, there is a 
problem determining the nature of the entity not in 
space and time. Blueness itself is not blue, since 
entities outside space and time are presumably 
colorless. Why, then, is the predicate used to 
describe the thing in space and time also employed to 
characterize the thing outside space and time? What, 
in short, is the point in calling the universal 
"blueness?" If the entity denoted by "blueness" has 
none of the characteristics of things in space and 
time, the inappropriateness of describing it in terms 
of spatially-temporally bound predicates is obvious. 
But we are then seemingly at a loss to say what a 
universal is. Second, sooner or later we must face the 
"classical difficulty" of Platonism. If instances of 
universals are in space and time and universals are 
not, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine the relationship between the two. The 
locutions "participate in'1 and "imitate" are sometimes 
employed; instances are said to "participate in" or to 
"imitate" universals. But the nature of 
"participation" or "imitation" is never made clear. 
What does it mean to say that something in space and 
time "participates in" or "imitates" something not in 
space and time? According to A. D. Woozley, the 
problem is "not almost impossibly difficult to solve 
but in principle insoluble." Woozlely's claim may be 
too strong, for things in space and time may indeed be 
related in one way or another to things not in space 
and time, and it may be possible for us more or less 
adequately to describe the relationships). It is, 
however, difficult. Third, the question is at least 
worth considering whether anything not in space and 
time should really be characterized as being universal, 
the term "universal" seemingly having to do with places 
and times. The whole point in calling a universal a 
universal would seem to be that it is the sort of thing 
which appears in various places at the same time. The 
view which claims that universals are outside space and 
time appears either to ignore or to blur this insight. 
Our dilemma is that if, on the one hand, the 
similarity between universals and instances is 
emphasized, universals, being particularized, are no 
longer universals. On the other hand, if the 
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difference between universals and instances is 
maximized, we no longer understand the nature of a 
universal, nor is the relationship between universals 
and instances at all clear, nor does the employment of 
the term "universal" seem faithful to what appears to 
be the root meaning of the word. 
We do not yet have a convincing argument showing 
that universals are in space and time, but there are 
clearly great difficulties in assuming that they are 
not. More positively, the inadequacies of Platonism 
may be taken to reveal what a more satisfactory account 
of sameness would have to accomplish. It would have to 
do justice to the universality of the phenomenon. 
Qualities can be in different places at the same time, 
and this important fact must not be forgotten. The 
fact that the qualities which constitute the phenomenon 
of sameness are themselves in space and time must be 
taken seriously. Furthermore, if there are entities 
not in space and time, the nature of these entities 
must be more fully explicated and the relationship of 
qualities to these entities more clearly specified. 
Although, as we have seen, there are difficulties 
associated with the traditional view, for a better 
understanding of what the Platonist is trying to say 
let us consider arguments designed to show that 
universals are not in space and time. The primary 
consideration in this regard seems to be . that certain 
things in space and time need accounting for and the 
account is not to be had in terms of the things in 
space and time themselves. It is chiefly the 
phenomenon of sameness which concerns us here, so let 
us turn our attention more specifically to it. 
First, there is the above-mentioned fact that the 
same quality can exist in different places at the same 
time. To give this phenomenon a name, let us call it 
"ubiquity," realizing that in the strict sense a 
quality such as the quality blue may not be ubiquitous. 
It is ubiquitous enough for our purposes. The question 
therefore arises: What accounts for ubiquity? In 
virtue of what are all blue things blue? How is it 
possible that different blue things can be blue at the 
same time? A causal answer is not expected, and one 
who insists on viewing the matter in this way will find 
only grief and befuddlement. Rather, the question 
invites a more general, descriptive account of the 
phenomenon, and it is the Platonist realist's 
contention that all blue things are blue and it is 
possible for different things to be blue at the same 
time because of the existence of a certain universal. 
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Perhaps less opaquely, they all fulfill the 
condition(s) for a thing's being blue. Wherever and 
whenever there are blue things, they are blue in virtue 
of their fulfilling certain conditions, whatever 
conditions are involved in something's being blue, and 
these conditions are what the Platonist is calling 
attention to with the word "blueness." No one would 
ever think that the conditions themselves are in space 
and time, and hence we arrive at the Platonist's 
conclusion that universals are not in space and time. 
A second characteristic of the phenomenon of 
sameness is that of repeatability. Not only is it 
possible for many blue things to exist at the same 
time, but they may also do so at different times. 
There is, to be sure, nothing remarkable about 
different things existing at different times, but, as 
we are accustomed to thinking, the same object does not 
go out of, and then return into, existence. Qualities 
do this. If all blue things were suddenly to 
disappear, it would always be possible for the same 
blue quality to recur. Qualities are repeatable, and 
this fact cries out for an account. Platonist 
relaists, then, point to the universal as accounting 
for this phenomenon. In other words, the possibility 
exists that the quality blue may be instantiated in 
different places at different times even if, at any 
given time, it may be instantiated nowhere. And this 
possibility exists. Light is shed on the meaning of the 
claim that universals are not in space and time when it 
is realized that one who says this is identifying 
universals with possibilities and taking very seriously 
the existence of possibilities. Realists of this sort 
are claiming that universals are possibilities, that 
possibilities are not in space and time, and that it is 
in virtue of certain possibilities that the phenomenon 
of repeatability is to be accounted for. 
Whether conditions are identical with possibilities 
is, for our purposes, perhaps moot. The Platonist 
wants to identify them, because a universal is supposed 
to be unitary. Little harm would seem to be done if we 
allow that the thing that accounts for ubiquity also 
provides the ground for repeatability. On the other 
hand, if someone were to insist on two different kinds 
of universals, each grounding its own particular 
phenomenon, I, for one, would have no qualms in 
admitting it. Of greater significance is that, for the 
Platonist, these conditions or possibilities with which 
universals are identified do not themselves exist in 
space and time. 
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While there are other arguments designed to show 
that universals are not in space and time, the 
foregoing are some of the more interesting arguments, 
or at least some of the ones more frequently advanced. 
It is my hope to have clarified what the Platonist is 
trying to say. 
We have examined arguments favoring the view that 
universals are in space and time and also those 
supporting the view that they are not. And we have 
considered objections to Platonism. In the interest of 
fairness, we ought to ask if there are criticisms of 
the empiricist's position. 
The independence thesis might be thought to count 
against the empiricist's view. One who claims that 
universals are in space and time must admit that 
universals come into, and pass' out of, existence. And 
thi.6 contradicts the independence thesis. For his 
part, however, the empiricist might suggest that one of 
the problems with the traditional view is the 
independence thesis and that there is really nothing 
odd about the constant exits and . entrances of 
universals. We also ought not to forget that the 
emiricist refuses to countenance the notion of 
uninstantiated universals, which the independence 
thesis seems to entail. 
Most damaging to the empiricist's position is that 
it fails to provide an ontological ground for sameness. 
Although, to his credit, he never loses sight of the 
ubiquity of qualities or denies the fact of 
repeatability, the proponent of the view that 
universals are in space and time never really provides 
a genuine account for these phenomena. Thus 
Brownstein, for example, in his admirable Aspects of 
the Problem of Universals, argues that qualities are 
universals, and" By this he means that they are 
identical. Brownstein effectively demolishes both 
nominalism, which may be viewed as the attempt to 
deny the phenomenon- of sameness, and the thesis of 
perfect particulars, which attempts to ground the 
sameness of qualities in a relation of exact 
similarity. As we have already observed, he finds 
fault with a Platonism which pays only lip service to 
the ubiquity of qualities. However, perhaps 
paradoxically but perhaps also for reasons we can 
understand, one searches in vain for something like an 
account of ubiquity. Conditions and possibilities, as 
I have developed these notions, or anything remotely 
like them, are not even hinted at. Therefore, the 
Platonist can claim that the position ultimately fails 
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to provide a ground for sameness. If one merely 
identifies a quality with a universal and leaves the 
matter at that, why make the identification to begin 
with? 
We would appear to be at an impasse. In the 
empiricist's view, the Platonist fails to do justice to 
the ubiquity of qualities. According to the Platonist 
the empiricist fails to ground the ubiquity and 
repeatability of qualities. Furthermore, the two views 
seem to be resolutely incompatible with one another, 
since, clearly, universals are either in space and time 
or they are not. Perhaps, we ought to take another 
tack, holding in abeyance the criticisms of the 
respective positions and considering their advantages 
instead. 
Advantages of the empiricist viewpoint are, first, 
that universals are not particularized, so that what 
the empiricist calls a universal appears to be more 
genuinely universal. Second, it does not encounter the 
criticism that the entity it calls a universal has none 
of the characteristics of things in space and time, but 
yet is described in terms of spatially-temporally bound 
predicates. Blueness really is blue, in the 
empiricist's view. Third, since instances do not 
exist, the empiricist does not have to worry about the 
relation between a universal and its instances. Hence, 
the position escapes the "classical difficulty" of 
Platonism. Fourth, the empiricist's view seems to take 
more seriously the idea that the term "universal" 
really concerns things in places and times. The 
position pays due respect to the ubiquity of qualities 
and, once again, seems to have more genuine claim to 
what would appear to be the root meaning of the term. 
The one, but not inconsiderable, advantage of 
Platonism is that it makes a more forthright attempt to 
provide an ontological ground for sameness. If the 
characterization suggested earlier of what the realist 
is trying to do is correct, then, perhaps contrary to 
his expectations, the empiricist finds himself with a 
conspicuous hole in his theory—a failure to account 
for the phenomenon. Whether or not the Platonist 
succeeds in accounting for it, he at least makes a 
more robust attempt. 
Why does the empiricist make a less robust attempt? 
The reasons, I suggest, are at least two, an 
examination of which reveals the most fundamental 
difference between the two positions. 
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One of these is that the empiricist is, after all, 
an empiricist, so it should not come as too great a 
surprise to discover that the battle is joined over the 
empiricism/rationalism issue. A commitment to 
rationalism does not, of course, entail belief that 
universals are not in space and time, but the 
rationalist will at least not feel too uncomfortable 
with Platonism. If universals are not in space and 
time, they are not known on the basis of sensory 
experience. One who grants ontological status to 
conditions and possibilities does so on the basis of 
the dialectic. As we have seen, it is by means of a 
process of reasoning, not sense experience, that the 
Platonist arrives at the existence of such things. One 
argues that conditions and possibilities account for 
the phenomena of ubiquity and repeatability. In so 
doing, he provides a "transcendental argument," which I 
will understand as an argument intending to establish 
the existence of an entity or entities on a priori 
considerations alone. Typically, a transcendental 
argument proceeds by claiming that if such and such an 
entity did not exist, then certain phenomena would not 
be as they are. But the phenomena are as they are, and 
therefore such and such an entity does exist. 
Empiricists have usually been suspicious of claims 
concerning the existence of entities not accessible to 
direct acquaintance, and they have characteristically 
been wary of transcendental arguments. The reluctance 
to grant the existence of Platonic universals may be 
traced in part to the very empiricism of the 
empiricist. As in the case of rationalism, a 
commitment to empiricism does not entail belief that 
universals are in space and time, for one might want to 
deny the existence of universals altogether. But the 
empiricist will probably find the view more congenial, 
since qualities are accessible to sense experience. 
A second and related reason for the empiricist's 
skepticism may have to do with the terminology often 
employed by the Platonist. The Platonist speaks of 
"entities" or "things" which are not themselves in 
space and time and which have none of the 
characteristics of things in space and time. 
Nonetheless, they are said to "account for" certain 
phenomena in space and time. Blueness is supposed to 
account for the fact that all blue things are blue. 
Or, worse yet, blue things "participate in" or 
"imitate" blueness. All of this sounds odd to the 
empiricist's already sensitive ear, for what the 
Platonist seems to be doing is introducing "queer and 
weird entities, things best shunned." The Platonist, 
in short, appears to be guilty of a hypostatization. 
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And the fear of a hypostatization is quite evidently 
related to the suspicion of entities not accessible to 
acquaintance. One who is already inclined to trust 
only the evidence of the senses, and perhaps not even 
that very much, will most assuredly be disinclined to 
accept claims asserting the existence of "things" which 
are not even in principle capable of being objects of 
acquaintance. 
The interesting questions, then, concern the 
relative viability of empiricism and the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the terminology 
of Platonism. 
Let us treat the latter question first. More 
specifically, does Platonism involve a hypostatization? 
A hypostatization would be involved only if the terms 
"universal," "participates in," etc. designated only 
ideas or concepts, perhaps construed as peculiarly 
mental entities, but with no objective referents. 
Clearly, the Platonist will be unwilling to admit that 
these terms lack objective referents, so perhaps the 
question is whether the Platonist is able to state his 
case in a less objectionable manner. That is, can he 
present what he believes to be the facts of the matter 
without invoking the more traditional terminology? If 
the analysis offered earlier is correct, the question 
whether universals exist is the question whether 
conditions and possibilities exist, so what we want to 
know is whether the Platonist is guilty of a 
hypostatization in regard to these things. Can the 
empiricist admit that conditions and possibilities 
exist? 
First, let us retreat one step and inquire 
concerning the areas in which the empiricist and the 
Platonist already seem to agree. They both admit the 
fact of sameness; they do not dispute the phenomena of 
ubiquity and repeatability. There is, moreover, no 
conflict over the idea that phenomena are to be 
accounted for. Neither denies, in other words, that 
there are qualities and that upon reflection certain 
facts about qualities emerge which are to be grounded 
ontologically. The only apparent difference is that 
what the Platonist calls an instance, the empiricist 
calls a universal. But they do not disagree with what 
the terms "instance" and "universal" denote. They do 
not, that is, deny that there are things in space and 
time which display certain interesting characteristics. 
The difference between the Platonist and the empiricist 
at the level of objects in space and time, I am 
suggesting, is merely terminological. But if this is 
157 
so, then at least, here the empiricist has no real 
quarrel with the Platonist. Let us see if the same 
thing may be said at the level of things outside space 
and time. 
Following our adopted strategy, we are putting the 
question not in terms of whether Platonic universals 
exist, but in what are hoped to be more familiar, less 
metaphorical, terms. What we want to know is whether 
the empiricist can grant that conditions and 
possibilities exist. The answer to this question is 
relatively straightforward: A strict empiricist will' 
be unable to admit that conditions and possibilities 
exist. A strict empiricist will be unable to admit the 
existence of anything which in principle is not an 
object of direct acquaintance, nor is he able to accept 
the legitimacy of transcendental arguments. Someone of 
this persuasion will be unable to admit that conditions 
and possibilities exist, or, which is to say the same 
thing, he must deny the existence of Platonic 
universals. It turns out, then, that the difference 
between the two views concerning things not in space 
and time is not merely terminological, for even with 
the less objectionable nomenclature the strict 
empiricist has a real disagreement with the Platonist. 
What this also means, is that the strict empiricist 
fails to provide an ontological ground for the 
phenomena. This would obviously not be viewed as a 
problem by anyone who would try to deny the legitimacy 
of the entire ontological undertaking. But the 
empiricist realist, we remember, is already committed 
to an attempt to account for the phenomena. The 
empiricist has admitted all along that there is a fact 
of sameness, that ubiquity and repeatability exist, and 
that these things are to be accounted for. So he must 
own up to what we have already seen to be the serious 
objection to the empiricist position. The suggestion 
was made that Brownstein's view, for example, 
ultimately fails to provide a ground for sameness, and 
if this is true of Brownstein's view, this is true of 
the empiricist view in general. A position which in 
the end overlooks conditions and possibilities, or 
something like these, fails to account for the 
phenomena. 
It is- not my intention to criticize a stringent 
empiricism. However, the empiricist realist may, 1 
believe, at least consider the possibility that if a 
stringent empiricism is incompatible with the ability 
to carry through an analysis of sameness, it may be the 
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empiricism, not the attempt to ground the phenomenon, 
which is fundamentally misguided. 
The empiricist must disavow either a strict 
empiricism or the ontological undertaking itself. Let 
us assume it is the former. Then it may turn out that 
the empiricist is able to buy into the substance of 
what the Platonist is claiming while perhaps rejecting 
his terminology. If universals are really conditions 
or possibilities and the empiricist can be convinced 
that these latter account for phenomena he has already 
admitted exist, a functional equivalence between Iiis 
view and that of the Platonist is revealed. It has 
already been suggested that what the empiricist calls a 
"universal" the Platonist calls an "instance," and 
actually the same thing is denoted by both terms. It 
now emerges that if the empiricist is willing to make 
an important concession, it can be granted that what he 
calls a condition or a possibility a Platonist calls a 
universal, but that the terms "condition," 
"possibility," and "universal" actually refer to one 
and the same thing. The difference between the two 
positions will be merely a difference in terminology. 
Nomenclature is, however, important. The 
empiricist may be better able to grasp other aspects of 
Platonism if they are put in terms of a less forbidding 
terminology. Construing universals as conditions or as 
possibilities coheres nicely, for example, with the 
Platonist's independences thesis. Qualities may come 
and go; conditions, or possibilities, exist 
independently. An uninstantiated universal, then, is 
simply an unfulfilled condition, or set of conditions, 
or an unrealized possibility. It is probably important 
also to mention that it is not really the 
responsibility of the Platonist to name any 
uninstantiated universal. One is presumably able to 
name a universal only on the basis of an acquaintance 
with one or more of its instances. The fact that we 
are unable to name any uninstantiated universal does 
not count against the Platonist 1s claim that such 
things exist. The claim is merely a reflection of the 
independence of conditions or possibilities. 
Similarly, viewing a universal as a condition, a 
set of conditions, or a possibility, helps to clarify 
the relation between the entity which is in space and 
time and that which is not. It is merely that of a 
fulfillment of a condition, or a set of conditions, or 
a realization of a possibility. This terminology may 
be viewed as an improvement on the Platonist's 
"participation" or "imitation," because it is less 
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metaphorical. Actually, talk of "participation" or 
"imitation" ought to be abandoned if for no other 
reason than that it leads one to think that universals 
are similar to their instances. If the above analysis 
is correct, a universal is nothing at all like an 
instance. Universals themselves are not universal; 
they account for a universal phenomenon, that of 
sameness. The "classical difficulty" of Platonism is 
not thereby "solved," for it remains to be shown more 
precisely just what sort of relation a relation is 
which relates an entity in space and time with one 
which is not. Clarification is needed on what, 
exactly, it means to say that universals "account for" 
sameness. But it is hoped that the language of 
"conditions," "fulfillment," etc. at least aids the 
empiricist in understanding the Platonist 16 claim. 
Even more, the degree of understanding should be 
sufficient to enable him to see that he, too ought to 
be a Platonist. Why is it, then, that every realist 
should be a Platonist? Every realist should admit the 
phenomenon of sameness, that is, he should admit the 
facts of ubiquity and repeatability. He should also 
admit the existence of conditions and possibilities 
which ground ubiquity and repeatability. He should 
admit the independence of conditions and possibilities. 
And that makes him a Platonist. 
A tentative suggestion explaining why some realists 
are not Platonists is that they find themselves more or 
less loosely associated with a tradition that claims 
adherence to a "Principle of Acquaintance," according 
to which any candidate for an ontology must be an 
object with which we are directly acquainted. These 
philosophers are the heirs of a truncated form of 
logical positivism, which on strict empiricist grounds 
attempted to deny the meaningfulness of metaphysics 
altogether. The dilemma in which they now find 
themselves is that they attempt to do metaphysics while 
still claiming allegiance to an empiricism which 
undermines the very enterprise. As far as I am able to 
determine, they are only vaguely aware that they are 
confronted with a dilemma. If the foregoing paper has 
succeeded in showing anything at all, it is, I hope, 
that the empiricist realist has not yet entirely rid 
himself of the shackles of positivism. 
I have argued that every realist should be a 
Platonist, but not, it should be noted, that everyone 
who thinks about these matters should be a realist. Of 
course, nominalism, which is the attempt to deny that 
the phenomenon of sameness exists, seems to me so 
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absurd as to scarcely deserve mentioning. And if 
anyone would deny the legitimacy of the ontological 
undertaking itself, the burden of proof is on him to 
produce arguments showing its illegitimacy. 
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NOTES 
"""I am indebted to my colleague, Professor William 
Edgar, and to my former colleague, Professor Stewart 
Umphrey, for stimulating my interest in the problem of 
universals. Some of the ideas here presented were 
originally theirs. They are not, however, responsible 
for mistakes made in the paper. 
2 . Cf. the view of A. D. Woozley: "Generality is an 
essential feature of the objects of experience, 
recognition of generality is an essential feature of 
experience itself, and reflection of this generality is 
shown in the vocabulary of any language, all the words 
of which (with the exception of proper names) are 
general." A. D. Woozley, "Universals," The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8 (Ed. Paul Edwards. 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., & The Free Press, 
1967), p. 194. 
3 
Woozley, p. 196. 
4 . 
Gilbert Ryle, "Plato," The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 6 (Ed. Paul Edwards. New YorkT 
Macmillan Publishing Co., & The Free Press, 1967), p. 
322. 
5 A particular of this sort would be a "bare 
particular, 1 1 or a substratum—something which is the 
bearer or ordinary qualities, but which is not itself 
characterized by any ordinary qualities. Notice that I 
am distinguishing between an instance of a universal 
and a particular. The Platonist identifies the quality 
with the instance, and the empiricist identifies the 
quality with the universal. Either philosopher may 
hold, in addition, that particulars exist. If the 
Platonist does, he then has to explain the relation(s) 
between instances and particulars, while the empiricist 
must account for the relation(s) between universals and 
particulars. Unless I am mistaken, the question 
16 2 
whether particulars exist is unaffected by the position 
taken with regard to the nature of a universal. 
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^Donald Brownstein, Aspects of the Problem of 
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'Brownstein, passim. 
1 3Brownstein, p. 17ff. 
* 4 I n fairness, the Platonist really does not deny_. 
the ubiquity of qualities, for that is what, with ~~hTs 
notion of a universal, he is trying to account for. 
The empiricist is claiming that the Platonist 1s 
universals are not themselves ubiquitous. 
1 5Wolterstorff, p. 103. 
This is the response to Brownstein. A universal 
is one thing without being "one thing" in the sense 
that a particular is. 
